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ABSTRACT
It has been hypothesized that the capacity of universal basic income (UBI) to
attract wider public support is impaired by the strength of productivist
cultural norms and values, common to the majority of develope societies. The
paper contributes to literature on attitudes towards UBI by empirically
investigating this hypothesis from a multi-level cross-national perspective,
using the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 8 data on UBI support for 23
countries. It seeks to determine whether and to what extent the strength of
cultural productivism can explain cross-national variation in public support for
the implementation of UBI. Two main findings are reported. First, the results
demonstrate that the public are less susceptible to supporting UBI in
countries where average employment commitment is higher. Second, the
results show that, even though employment commitment is a strong
predictor of cross-national variation in the public support for UBI, the effect is
surpassed and explained by GDP, which itself is negatively related to the
outcome. The study argues that the capacity of UBI to appeal to the general
public is limited by the prosperity of post-industrial societies, rather than by
the cultural attachment of their populations to paid work.
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Introduction
In recent years, there has been renewed public and media interest in uni-
versal basic income (UBI). UBI has been debated as an alternative to post-
war welfare institutions in the era when employment no longer secures
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financial security while human labour is under increasing risk of replace-
ment by artificial intelligence (van der Veen and Groot 2000). Public and
media attention reached its peak between 2016 and 2018 when a campaign
in Switzerland resulted in an unsuccessful referendum about the proposal,
and the Finnish government launched an experiment with UBI paid to a
sample of jobseekers (De Wispelaere 2016). Systematic attention has also
been paid to UBI in academia (for an overview, seeWiderquist et al. 2013).
Researchers have investigated a wide range of UBI-related topics, includ-
ing the proposal’s normative justifications (e.g. Van Parijs 1992), the tech-
nical aspects of implementation as well as the potential effects on the
economy and society (see Gilroy et al. 2013; Sommer 2016; Pereira 2017).
A growing research area investigates the feasibility of UBI with respect
to public support for its implementation (Andersson and Kangas 2005;
Bay and Pedersen 2006; Parolin and Siöland 2020; Vlandas 2019).
However, systematic attention has not yet been paid to one ideological
factor traditionally perceived as hindering the proposal’s public accep-
tance. At a theoretical level, scholars have argued that the public are unli-
kely to find UBI normatively legitimate and pointed to the contrast
between the non-productivist nature of its underlying principles and the
productivist normative foundations of modern societies (van der Veen
1991; Goodin 2001; Offe 2001; Bauman 2005; De Wispelaere and
Noguera 2012). According to the argument, citizens of modern work-
societies, socialized into beliefs about the individual and collective
desirability of paid work (Offe 1992), are unlikely to support a welfare
reform which explicitly assumes the decoupling of income and welfare
entitlements from income-earning activities (Offe et al. 1996).
But is the strength of productivist cultural norms and values really a
decisive factor which impairs support for the implementation of UBI?
Are societies where paid work carries a stronger cultural importance
less prone to being sympathetic towards UBI? If so, does cultural produc-
tivism explain the support as the most important factor, independently of
other macro-characteristics associated with pro-welfare attitudes?
The article aims to contribute to welfare attitudes research by empiri-
cally examining these questions from a multi-level cross-national perspec-
tive, using the ESS Round 8 data on 23 developed societies. While not the
first analysis of ESS data on public support for UBI, the paper comp-
lements existing studies (see Parolin and Siöland 2020; Vlandas 2019)
with its specific focus on cultural productivism hypothesis. The paper
proceeds as follows. The first part reviews the theoretical argument
about why the strength of productivist cultural norms and values may
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interfere with the public’s support for UBI, putting it in the context of
evidence from welfare attitudes research. It then discusses cultural
productivism and argues for a distinction between its normative and
expressive dimensions. Alternative explanations for cross-national
variation in support of UBI are considered next. The analytical part
begins with a formulation of hypotheses and a description of data,
together with measures of variables. Descriptive results are presented
first, followed by multi-variate results from mixed-effects logistic models
with country-level random intercepts. The study is concluded by a
discussion of the results in light of relevant theories.
Literature review
Cultural productivism and public support for the implementation of
UBI
UBI is generally defined ‘an income paid by a political community to all its
members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement’
(Van Parijs 2004, 8). The main feature which distinguishes UBI from
existing welfare arrangements is the non-productivist nature1 of its under-
lying principles. While essentially all modern welfare states are producti-
vist, in the sense that they are concerned with ensuring the smooth supply
of labour to productive sectors of the economy (Goodin 2001) and assume
that all able-bodied persons should be under economic compulsion to
perform paid work (van der Veen 1991), UBI asserts a decoupling of
income entitlements from income-earning activities (Offe et al. 1996).
Such a decoupling has been advocated as just and necessary for the main-
tenance of financial security in precarious economic contexts (van der
Veen and Groot 2000). On the other hand, it has been recognized as
potentially problematic with respect to UBI’s feasibility. Since productivist
norms are considered to characterize modern societies as such, it has been
hypothesized that the general public may perceive a non-productivist UBI
proposal as ideologically illegitimate (Offe 2001; Bauman 2005; DeWispe-
laere and Noguera 2012). Offe (2001) argues that individuals’ expectations
have been so fundamentally shaped by hegemonic ideas about the normal-
ity of productive activities and the anomalousness of unearned benefits,
1Some versions of UBI advocated by the political right (e.g., Friedman 1968) may actually be perceived as
productivist. These typically assume below-subsistence payments and the abolishment of existing social
transfers (De Wispelaere 2016), thus reducing effective marginal tax rates and incentivizing low-paid
employment (Gorz 1999). This seems unlikely to be the case in the present study; the UBI conceptual-
ization by ESS assumes the grant covers ‘essential living costs’ and replaces ‘many’ but not all benefits.
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that the work-centred belief system has become largely immune to any
revision attempts. In a similar fashion, De Wispelaere and Noguera
(2012) assert that a widely shared belief that paid work is a core value
and obligation and that benefits should be restricted to those who
deserve them limits UBI’s capacity to generate positive reactions among
the general public.
Despite these concerns, prior representative polls have revealed that
UBI enjoys substantial, albeit varying degrees of, public support in
different national contexts.2 In 2018, 48% of Americans favoured UBI
to compensate workers who had lost jobs due to advances in artificial
intelligence (Gallup Inc. and Northeastern University 2018). Similarly,
49% of Britons in 2017 said they would support the UK government in
introducing UBI (Ipsos MORI 2017). Results from Scandinavian countries
showed that 69% of Finns in 2015 (Kela 2016, 9), 66% of Norwegians in
2003 (Bay and Pedersen 2006) and 46% of Swedes in 2001 (Andersson
and Kangas 2005) supported the idea of UBI.
The existing studies have yet to explore whether and to what extent
public support for UBI can be related to the strength of productivist cul-
tural norms and values. Some studies have examined the effect of individ-
uals’ perception of deservingness of needy groups. Arguably, individuals
who believe that neediness is a result of personal failure should also
value hard work and effort. Andersson and Kangas (2005) reported that
individual blame for unemployment and poverty was the only factor
which explained the variance in attitudes concerning UBI in both
Sweden and Finland. Bay and Pedersen (2006) also showed that
Norwegians who believed that the poor themselves are to be blamed for
their situation were less likely to sympathize with UBI.
Useful information can be inferred from studies investigating the
impact of productivist norms on preferences for welfare policies based
on opposite principles, such as conditionality and targeting. In a Dutch
study, Jeene et al. (2013) found that the work ethic measured at the indi-
vidual level increased the emphasis on deservingness criteria for disability
pension recipients. Such a relationship was also found with respect to
preferences for the design of unemployment benefits. In a study of 24
European countries, Reeskens and van Oorschot (2013) showed that
individuals living in societies where economic productivity is seen as
important have stronger preferences for a meritocratic system of
2Comparability of those polls is limited due to different wording of the UBI question (see Online Appendix
A, Table A1 for an overview).
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unemployment benefits, which disproportionally rewards those who con-
tribute to the production of welfare.
Dimensions of productivism
Productivist cultural norms and values have been claimed to characterize
virtually all modern societies so profoundly that scholars refer to these as
waged-work societies (Offe 1992; Bauman 2005). If exaggerated, this argu-
mentation would imply that the implementation of UBI is equally unfea-
sible in any developed society. However, cross-national work orientation
research has demonstrated that modern societies differ greatly with
respect to the strength of various work-related attitudes (Gesthuizen
and Verbakel 2011; Stam et al. 2013; Turunen and Nätti 2017).
This paper narrows its focus to two dimensions of work orientations,
which reflect the main types of the cultural importance of work beyond
its manifest income-producing function. If aggregated at the level of
countries, they can be used to characterize the strength of the productivist
cultural ethos of entire societies.
The first dimension of cultural productivism reflects the degree to which
work is considered to be normatively important, i.e. valued as a moral obli-
gation to which individuals are subjected (Furåker 2012). This type of
importance corresponds to the sociological category of the work ethic,
that is, a conviction that work is primarily a moral duty and not a matter
of personal motives, preferences or values (Stam et al. 2013). The work
ethic is based on values such as hardwork, self-denial and avoidance of idle-
ness (Highhouse et al. 2010). Previous research has shown that there is a
substantial cross-national variation in the work ethic across societies. In
the European context, a stronger work ethic was found in countries with
a Muslim and Orthodox religious heritage and in societies with a commu-
nist past, while a weaker work ethic was found in economically advanced
societies as well as in those with generous welfare states (Stam et al. 2013).
The second dimension of productivism reflects the degree to which
work is expressively important, i.e. valued for beneficial intrinsic proper-
ties which motivate the willingness to engage in productive activities. This
dimension can be captured by the concept of employment commitment,
established in work orientations research. The concept measures
people’s willingness to work by asking whether they would continue
working even if the financial need to work was removed (Furåker 2012).
Employment commitment reflects the essence of a new type of work
ethic of self-expression which emphasizes values of commitment, personal
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growth and self-indulgence (Highhouse et al. 2010) and which has been
considered to replace the traditional work ethic of duty in post-industrial
societies (Méda and Vendramin 2017). Comparative research has found a
stronger employment commitment in economically prosperous countries
(Turunen and Nätti 2017), country contexts with generous welfare
benefits (Esser 2005), and high and activating social spending (van der
Wel and Halvorsen 2015).
Alternative explanations
Earlier analyses of the ESS data indicated that stronger support for UBI is
found in countries with lower social spending (Parolin and Siöland 2020)
and less generous welfare regimes (Vlandas 2019), suggesting that Eur-
opeans welcome the schememainly as a way to improve their welfare stan-
dards (Meuleman 2018). Hence, individuals’ preferences for UBI may be
also shaped by factors associated with general pro-welfare attitudes.
First, the cross-national variation in UBI support could reflect compo-
sitional differences between countries with respect to social categories
prone to supporting public welfare. Such categories comprise individuals
with utilitarian self-interest in welfare programmes, and/or those whose
support reflects an ideological position. Women, young adults, individuals
with low skills and income, and the unemployed are typically recognized
among the supportive classes. From an ideological perspective, personal
values such as egalitarian ideology and trust have been identified among
the attitudinal covariates of public welfare support (compare Blekesaune
and Quadagno 2003; Gelissen 2008; Dallinger 2010).
Second, support for UBI may be affected by the welfare institutions that
are currently in place. Redistributive policies are typically less advocated in
countries with high welfare spending, where high tax burdens discourage
citizens from supporting further redistribution (Gelissen 2008; Pfeifer
2009). On the other hand, demand for redistribution is higher in societies
with higher income inequalities (Midtbø 2018).
Third, cultural context could matter too. Support for universalistic
benefits in general requires cultural characteristics, such as trust and a
commitment to egalitarian values (Bay and Pedersen 2006). High trusting
countries tend to be more supportive of public welfare (Blekesaune and
Quadagno 2003), while ideologically egalitarian societies are less con-
ditional in terms of their solidarity with those in need (van Oorschot 2006).
Fourth, public support for UBI can also be affected by business cycle
phases. Support for redistribution and sympathy for needy groups are
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typically higher when unemployment increases and lower in times of
economic prosperity (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Pfeifer 2009; Dal-
linger 2010).
Finally, cross-national variation in support of UBI can also reflect
differences in socio-economic development. Wealthy countries have a
different composition of population in terms of education, family patterns
or life expectancy (Midtbø 2018), as well as with respect to the value orien-
tations of their citizens, who tend to prioritize autonomy and self-
expression over material security (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
Contribution, aim, hypotheses
Although cultural discourses about the importance of paid work have
been repeatedly considered to pose a challenge for UBI’s public accep-
tance, the argument has been justified mainly at the theoretical level.
This paper aims to contribute to welfare attitudes research by empirically
examining the argument from a multi-level cross-national perspective.
Two general hypotheses are formulated.
If the theoretical logic of the argument holds, support for UBI should be
lower in countries where productivist norms and values are more pro-
nounced (H1). Since there are two different dimensions to the cultural
importance of work, there are also two alternative versions of this hypoth-
esis. The first version expects to find weaker support for UBI in countries
where the social norm to work is high, i.e. in societies with a stronger
work ethic (H1a). The second version expects to find lower UBI support
in countrieswhere the expressive importance ofwork is high, i.e. in societies
characterized by a stronger employment commitment (H1b).
The second hypothesis investigates the relative strength and robustness
of the assumed relationship (H2). If the main obstacle preventing UBI
from gaining substantial popular support is cultural productivism, one
should expect the effect to be relatively stronger than the effects of other
macro-covariates associated with the public’s support for welfare and
redistribution (H2a). If cultural productivism explains attitudes towards
UBI as a factor sui generis, the effect is also expected to be sustained
when these characteristics are controlled for (H2b).
Data
The paper uses survey data from the ESS Round 8 (ESS 2016). The module
was fielded in 2016/2017 and addressed to nationally representative
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samples of the following 23 countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Fed-
eration, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Responses with
missing values were list-wise deleted and the pooled sample used in the
analysis consisted of 39,016 individuals clustered within 23 countries.
Method
Given the hierarchical structure of the data and the multi-level nature of
the research problem, the models were estimated as mixed-effects logistic
regressions with country-specific random intercepts. To facilitate the
interpretation of results, all predictors were grand-mean centred
(Enders and Tofighi 2007). Additionally, quantitative variables were stan-
dardized by twice their standard deviation, to allow for direct comparison
of their relative effect sizes (Gelman 2008).
Measures of variables
Dependent variable
Respondents’ support for the implementation of UBI in their country
was used as a dependent variable. A short introductory paragraph
explaining the basic principles of UBI was presented first, followed by
a question investigating the degree of support for the scheme. The
definition of UBI provided to the respondents is specific and makes
reference to both its benefits and associated costs. One can thus expect
to obtain more realistic estimates of respondents’ support for UBI,
which was found to be sensitive to the phrasing and framing of the ques-
tion (Bay and Pedersen 2006; Ipsos MORI 2017). The wording of the
question was as follows:
Some countries are […] talking about introducing a basic income
scheme. […] A basic income scheme includes all of the following:
. The government pays everyone a monthly income to cover essential
living costs
. It replaces many other social benefits
. The purpose is to guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living
. Everyone receives the same amount regardless of whether or not they
are working
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. People also keep the money they earn from work or other sources
. This scheme is paid for by taxes
Overall, would you be against or in favour of having this scheme in
[your] country?
Respondents could express their support on a 1–4 scale anchored
according to the variants ‘Strongly against’ (value 1) and ‘Strongly in
favour’ (value 4). Responses were recoded into a binary variable with
the value 1 assigned to respondents supporting the implementation of
UBI and the value 0 assigned to those who were against.
Main country-level predictors
The first predictor of cultural productivism captures the normative impor-
tance of work in a country, measured as the average work ethic. The index is
based on a battery of items from the 2008/2009 wave of the European
Values Study (EVS 2015). For Israel, the indicator was aggregated from
the 1999/2004 wave of theWorld Value Study (WVS 2015). Although rela-
tively older, such attitudinal data tend to be rather stable over time and can
thus still appropriately capture the work ethic. Respondents were asked to
indicate their agreement with five statements: (a) ‘In order to fully develop
your talents, you need to have a job’; (b) ‘It is humiliating to receive money
without having towork for it’; (c) ‘Peoplewho donotwork become lazy’; (d)
‘Work is a duty towards society’; and (e) ‘Work should always come first,
even if it means less spare time’. The original response scale was anchored
according to the variants ‘Strongly agree’ (value 1) and ‘Strongly disagree’
(value 5). Reverse-coded responses were first averaged at the individual
level (Cronbach’s alpha 0.71) and aggregated at the country level using
survey weights. The construct’s theoretic range was between 1 and 5,
with higher values indicating a stronger average work ethic of a country.
The second predictor captures the strength of the expressive evaluation
of work in a country, measured as averaged employment commitment. The
measure is based on a two-item indicator of work centrality, aggregated
from International Social Survey Work Orientation data from 2015 or
from the latest available wave (ISSP Research Group 2017). It is measured
in terms of agreement with two statements: (a) ‘I would enjoy paid work,
even if I did not need the money’; (b) ‘Work is just a way of earning
money – nothing more’. Response scales for both items ranged from
‘Agree strongly’ (value 1) to ‘Disagree strongly’ (value 5). The scales were
first harmonized, then the summative scores were averaged at the
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country level by applying survey weights. The values of the composite scale
ranged between 1 and 5, increasingwith a higher average employment com-
mitment in a country.
Individual-level controls
Demographic and socio-structural variables were included as controls for
compositional differences in utilitarian self-interest in public welfare.
Gender is measured with a dummy variable, where the value 1 is assigned
to women and the value 0 is assigned to men. Age is measured in years
with a linear and a quadratic term, to capture the potential nonlinearities
of its effect. Educational attainment is measured as years of completed
formal education. Income is measured subjectively, as a feeling about
the household’s income expressed on a reverse-coded 1–4 scale. The
value 1 corresponds to the response variant ‘Very difficult on present
income’ and the value 4 stands for ‘Living comfortably on present
income’. Employment status is captured with a set of three dummies
based on respondents’ main activity seven days prior to the survey.
These indicate whether respondents were in paid employment, unem-
ployed or not active in the labour force. For each, the value 1 was given
to those who reported the given activity, and 0 otherwise.
Two value orientations associated with support for public welfare were
controlled for as well. A measure of interpersonal trust was constructed as
the average agreement with three statements regarding whether people: (a)
can be trusted, (b) try to take advantage of others and (c) are helpful most of
the time. The composite scale ranges between 0 and 10, increasing in the
direction of higher trust (Cronbach’s alpha 0.76). The measure for egalitar-
ianism is based on agreement with the statement ‘For a fair society, differ-
ences in the standard of living should be small’, indicated on a 1–5 scale.
Responses were reverse-coded, so that higher values indicate a higher ega-
litarian orientation. The value 5 corresponds to the category ‘Agree
strongly’ and the value 1 to the variant ‘Disagree strongly’.
Country-level controls
Countries’ cultural, institutional and socio-economic characteristics con-
sidered to affect welfare preferences were also included as controls. Where
possible, the values of covariates were lagged by one year, i.e. they corre-
spond to 2015 or the latest available year. Structural macro-characteristics
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typically require time to manifest and impact individual attitudes and
behaviours (see Schlueter et al. 2013, 673).
The first two macro-controls focus on the national cultural context
which is relevant to the support for universalistic benefits: aggregated
interpersonal trust and egalitarianism. Both measures are based on corre-
sponding individual-level variables from ESS data, weighted and averaged
at the country level.
Total social protection expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) obtained from International Labour Organization’s World
Social Protection Report 2017–19 (ILO 2017) is used as an indicator of
welfare generosity. Gini index of income inequality is used as a proxy for the
extent of redistribution. Harmonized unemployment rate is indicative of a
business cycle phase and GDP per head in terms of constant prices and pur-
chasing power parities (currency USD) is included to control for differences
in socio-economic development. All three measures were obtained from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2019).
Results
Country differences
Figure 1 shows the weighted proportions of individuals who are in favour
of implementing a UBI scheme in their country. Relatively high levels of
support are found in the majority of countries, albeit there is a substantial
cross-national variation. UBI is supported by more than half of the popu-
lation in 11 countries, while the majority of citizens in 12 countries are
against implementation. Countries with the highest share of those in
favour are Lithuania, Russia and Hungary. UBI implementation is most
strongly opposed in Norway, Switzerland and Sweden.
Figure 2 suggests that the two types of work importance are related to
support for UBI in opposite directions. Israel, Hungary and Portugal,
which score highest on the normative dimension of work importance, are
all countries with above 50% support for UBI. On the other hand, the
expressive dimension of work importance is clearly dominated by countries
where the majority reject the scheme, i.e. by Norway, Iceland and Sweden.
Multi-variate results
A series of multi-level logistic regressions was fitted to test the effect of the
cultural importance of paid work on support for UBI. A null model
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containing only random intercepts was estimated first (A1). According to
the intra-class correlation (ICC), 7% of the overall variance in UBI support
occurs due to respondents’ country-belonging, rather than due to their
individual characteristics.
Next, a model including individual-level controls was estimated (A2).
With respect to socio-structural variables, individuals supportive of the
implementation of UBI are, ceteris paribus, younger3, come from less
affluent households and/or have a weaker labour market attachment.
Looking at the value orientations, the results show that UBI is more
likely to find support among egalitarian respondents and those who
trust their fellow citizens. All in all, the model shows that the individual
Figure 1. Support for the implementation of UBI in the 23 analysed countries (own cal-
culations based on ESS 2016).
3Although the quadratic term is significant and positive, conversion to unstandardized metric reveals that
the effect changes from positive to negative only at 94 years of age.
12 M. KOZÁK
characteristics associated with UBI support are similar to the factors
related to general pro-welfare attitudes (Table 1).
In the next step, two country-level predictors of cultural productivism
were added to the model containing individual-level controls, first alone,
then together in one model. Model B1 shows that the effect of work’s nor-
mative importance is surprisingly positive, albeit relatively weak and
insignificant. Nor does it have any substantial explanatory power, as the
unchanged ICC value indicates. The results thus provide no evidence in
support of H1a. The average strength of the normative importance of
work does not seem to affect cross-national variation in preferences for
UBI.
The opposite is true for the expressive dimension of work’s cultural
importance. Its significant effect is stronger and negative (B2) and does
Figure 2. Work ethic and employment commitment in the 23 analysed countries (own
calculations based on EVS 2015; WVS 2015; ESS 2016; ISSP Research Group 2017).
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not change even when the effects of both predictors are estimated together
(B3). It also eliminates more than half of the initial share of variance at the
country level. The results suggest that citizens living in countries where
work is highly expressively valued, i.e. where workers are, on average,
more committed to paid work, are less likely to support the implemen-
tation of UBI. A higher expressive evaluation of work in a country
seems to hinder UBI’s capacity to generate more positive reactions
among the general public as expected by H1b (Table 2).
How strong is this effect, relatively speaking, compared to the effects of
other relevant macro-covariates on UBI support? To address H2a, six
country-level controls were included one by one in the model containing
only individual predictors. Relative sizes of their effects were then com-
pared with the effect of the employment commitment predictor from a
similar model (B2). Table 3 shows that the public’s sympathy with UBI
is lower in high trusting countries (C1), countries with compressed
income structures (C4) and affluent societies (C6). Neither the strength
of aggregated egalitarianism (C2), social protection expenditures (C3)
nor unemployment (C5) was found to explain country differences in
support for UBI. When compared to the effect of employment commit-
ment predictor, it is only the effect of GDP which is relatively stronger.
On the other hand, its explanatory power, as indicated by a reduction
in the initial ICC, is roughly similar. The results show that, although
Table 1. Effects of individual-level characteristics on support for UBI; multi-level logistic
regression.
A1 A2
Individual-level predictors Log-odds SE Log-odds SE
Intercept 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.10
Woman (ref. man) −0.03 0.02
Age −0.73 *** 0.13
Age squared 0.39 ** 0.14
Education −0.00 0.02
Income −0.28 *** 0.02
Not in labour force (ref. working) 0.10 *** 0.03
Unemployed (ref. working) 0.24 *** 0.05
Egalitarianism 0.53 *** 0.02
Trust 0.11 *** 0.02
Random effects variances
Individual level 3.29 3.29





Note: Statistical significance = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
SE = standard error; ref. = reference category; ICC = intra-class correlation; N = number of countries.
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the cultural evaluation of work is among the most influential macro-
factors associated with UBI support, it is not the single most important
factor.
Finally, the robustness of the negative relationship between the expres-
sive cultural importance of work and UBI support was put to a test (H2b).
Six country-level controls from Models C1-C6 were individually added to
the model including individual-level controls, together with the employ-
ment commitment predictor (i.e. B2). Since the work ethic predictor
was not found to be related to the outcome, it has been omitted from
this step of the analysis. Table 4 shows that the negative relationship
between the expressive evaluation of work and UBI support holds, even
when cultural context (D1-D2), social expenditures (D3), income inequal-
ities (D4) and unemployment (D5) are controlled for. The effect loses a
substantial part of its strength and becomes insignificant only when
socio-economic development is accounted for (D6). Not only is GDP
the strongest macro-predictor related to UBI support, the findings
suggest that it is also a mediating factor which simultaneously explains
the public’s expressive evaluation of work.4 Interestingly, GDP also
explains away the effects of the other two significant macro-predictors,
i.e. trust and inequality, when added as a control to Models C1 and C4
(models not reported).
To conclude, the results provide mixed evidence regarding the produc-
tivist hypothesis. While the cultural importance of work is undoubtedly a
factor that limits UBI’s potential to attract stronger popular support,
Table 2. Effects of main country-level predictors on support for UBI; multi-level logistic
regression.
B1 B2 B3
Country-level predictors Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE
Work ethic 0.27 0.16 0.08 0.14
Employment commitment −0.57 *** 0.14 −0.54 *** 0.15
Random effects variances
Individual level 3.29 3.29 3.29
Country level 0.18 0.12 0.11
ICC 0.05 0.03 0.03
N 23 23 23
Observations 39,016 39,016 39,016
Deviance 50,943.656 50,933.145 50,932.851
Note: Statistical significance = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. SE = standard error; ICC = intra-class
correlation; N = number of countries.
Controlled for individual-level characteristics (Table 1, Model A2).
4Compare with figures D1 and D2 in the Online Appendix D, which show country-level relationships
between public support for UBI and employment commitment, and UBI support and GDP.
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Table 3. Effects of country-level controls on support for UBI; multi-level logistic regression.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
Country-level predictors Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE
Trust −0.53 *** 0.14
Egalitarianism 0.22 0.18
Social protection expenditures −0.32 0.18
Gini index 0.36 * 0.17
Unemployment rate 0.10 0.19
GDP per head −0.62 *** 0.14
Random effects variances
Individual level 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
Country level 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.11
ICC 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
Observations 39,016 39,016 39,016 39,016 39,016 39,016
Deviance 50,935.328 50,944.832 50,943.303 50,941.990 50,945.953 50,931.933
Notes: Statistical significance = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. SE = standard error; ICC = intra-class correlation; N = number of countries.







Table 4. Effect of employment commitment on support for UBI, controlling for country-level characteristics; multi-level logistic regression.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
Country-level predictors Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE Log-odds SE
Employment commitment −0.39 * 0.17 −0.57 *** 0.13 −0.53 *** 0.13 −0.51 *** 0.14 −0.58 *** 0.14 −0.28 0.21
Trust −0.27 0.17
Egalitarianism 0.20 0.14
Social protection expenditures −0.21 0.14
Gini index 0.17 0.15
Unemployment rate −0.03 0.14
GDP per head −0.39 0.22
Random effects variances
Individual level 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
Country level 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10
ICC 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
Observations 39,016 39,016 39,016 39,016 39,016 39,016
Deviance 50,930.631 50,931.005 50,930.978 50,931.813 50,933.113 50,930.274
Notes: Statistical significance = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. SE = standard error; ICC = intra-class correlation; N = number of countries.









cross-national variation in UBI support seems to be primarily driven by
countries’ economic affluence.
Two sensitivity checks were conducted to test reliability of the findings.
First, to assess whether a significance assessment of country effects was not
affected by a relatively low number of countries, country-level models
were estimated as Bayesian with weakly informative priors, since they
deliver more robust estimates in small-C cases (Bryan and Jenkins
2016). The results of this check were almost identical to those reported
(see Online Appendix B). Next, the models were re-fitted without Switzer-
land, where viewpoints on UBI may be more salient and fixed, as a result
of the unsuccessful referendum from 2015. The only difference concerned
the negative effect of social expenditures, which became statistically sig-
nificant. The main findings remained unaffected (see Online Appendix C).
Discussion and conclusions
The main aim of this paper was to contribute to comparative welfare atti-
tudes research by examining the hypothesis about the negative impact of
productivist cultural norms and values on public support for the
implementation of UBI. The strength of cultural discourses about the
importance of paid work has been traditionally hypothesized to impair
UBI’s capacity to attract wider public support. However, this claim has
been justified mainly in the theoretical realm. The paper analysed the
2016 ESS Round 8 data on 23 European societies and empirically explored
the question from a multi-level cross-national perspective. There were two
main findings.
First, the results demonstrated that respondents living in societies
where paid work has a stronger cultural significance are less susceptible
towards supporting the implementation of UBI. However, it was not the
strength of the normative importance of work, traditionally understood
as the work ethic, which was found to affect the preferences. The societies
more sceptical with regard to UBI were those where work matters expres-
sively, i.e. where people’s average commitment to employment was higher.
Second, the paper sought to determine how the cultural importance of
work as an explanatory factor of UBI preferences compare with other
country characteristics associated with pro-welfare attitudes. The results
showed that, even though employment commitment is a strong predictor
of public support for UBI, its effect is, in terms of relative size, surpassed
by that of GDP, itself negatively related to the outcome. GDP was also the
only predictor which explained away the effect of employment
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commitment when both were estimated in one model. In other words, not
only are citizens of affluent societies more sceptical about UBI, this
affluence is also likely a factor which explains their stronger expressive
evaluation of work. According to the results, UBI’s capacity to appeal to
the general public seems to be limited by the prosperity of post-industrial
societies, rather than the cultural attachment of their population to paid
work.
A plausible explanation for why socio-economic development simul-
taneously limits citizens’ sympathies for UBI and increases their expres-
sive evaluation of work can be offered by modernization theory.
Inglehart andWelzel (2005) assert that, as the prosperity of post-industrial
societies increases, individuals tend to prioritize self-expression goals and
place a lesser focus on issues of material survival. Since affluent societies
have achieved relative material prosperity by other means, UBI may
appear to be redundant. Citizens of developed welfare states may also per-
ceive UBI as insufficiently flat, more so if the question specifies that it
entails the partial replacement of welfare programmes that currently
exist. A stronger expressive evaluation of work is also likely to be
brought about by restructuring the labour market brought about by
post-industrialization. As new better paid, more autonomous, and gener-
ally more desirable forms of immaterial labour proliferate in the service
sector of the economy, individuals’ opportunities to satisfy their self-
expression needs in work become more plentiful (Inglehart and Welzel
2005). Hence, the average willingness to work is likely to increase too.
This explanation is also in line with the results from work orientation
research, where it has been demonstrated that GDP is strongly related
to employment commitment (Turunen and Nätti 2017), and that
workers’ self-expressive work values are impacted by satisfaction of
their material needs and/or of their positive experiences with beneficial
intrinsic properties of work (Gallie 2007).
The findings are however not without limitations. The first issue con-
cerns the cross-sectional character of the ESS data, which means that
the results cannot be interpreted in causal terms. The second issue con-
cerns the reliability of the macro-predictors of cultural productivism.
Since ESS data include no measures of work orientations, they had to
be aggregated from other earlier sources and could only be used at the
level of countries.
Further research is needed to assess the extent to which the relationship
between the public’s preference for UBI and the cultural importance of
work is mediated by socio-economic development. Researchers could
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shed more light on the issue by looking at the dynamics of the relationship
at the individual level, that is, by examining how individuals’ work atti-
tudes impact their propensity to support UBI. Researchers could also
examine the issue by investigating preferences for other non-productivist
welfare policies. If the explanation offered in the paper holds, support for
these policies too should be indirectly related to employment commitment
through socio-economic development. Failure to observe such association
would, on the other hand, provide additional support to the legitimacy of
concerns regarding UBI’s specifically problematic relationship with cul-
tural discourses about the importance of paid work.
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